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Abstract: This paper examines the concept, theory, and practice of the
right to self-determination as applied in some countries.  The secessionist
movement in the Philippines led by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) has focused and relied on the international community to support
its struggle for a Bangsa Moro (Moro Nation) right to self-determination.
However, the reality in the world state system is the protection of the
state’s territorial integrity rather than its impairment. The paper argues
that the internationally-recognized right to self-determination is a shaky
promise of independence to nations and peoples who seek independence
from the state. Unless the state addresses the fundamental grievances
of Muslims in the Philippines in appropriate, relevant, and timely policies
that substantially and tangibly work toward greater democracy, deeper
participation, and better governance, secessionism as a political
alternative cannot be completely disregarded as a final option.
Key Words: self-determination, Moro, Philippines, MILF, peace,
Mindanao.
In t roduc t ion
The search for substantial political autonomy among Muslims in the
Philippines continues. The failure of the state to ensure meaningful
autonomy through the formal structures of regional government, the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) created in 1990,
has left the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) the option of achieving
self-governance using the guarantees of international laws on the right
of peoples and nations to self-determination.
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This paper examines the prospect of self-determination as an
alternative route towards Bangsamoro’s political independence from the
Philippine state. It analyzes relevant provisions of international laws and
covenants as well as practices of the international system in
operationalizing the concept of the right to self-determination (RSD).
The paper argues that while international laws and covenants flaunt
the right of peoples and nations to self-determination, the international
state system ensures that the state’s territorial integrity is upheld and
respected. This makes the right to self-determination an arduous path
to people who cherish to live separately from the state.
The Moro self-determination in brief historical perspective
The quest of the Muslims of Mindanao to create their own sovereign
state is hinged on the people’s continued definition and re-definition of
their national identity. Called Moro1 by the Spaniards, the notion of
Muslim nationhood crystallized when the Philippines was still a colony
of the United States (US) of America. Beginning in early 1920s, Muslim
leaders of Sulu and Mindanao began a peaceful movement that asserted
their right to establish their own nation-state and form a government of
their choice. Leaders petitioned and offered the following alternatives
for the US Congress to consider: One, that Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan
become part of the Federal Government of the United States; two, be
declared as a separate sovereign state from the would-be Republic of
the Philippines; and three, be made an unorganized territory of the US.
The last option rests on the hope that Muslims would gain their
independence in the event that the US finally relinquishes its power over
colonies and other non-governing territories in the future (see Gowing
1979; Tan 1993; Lingga 2002 for detailed account). Notably, being
part of the Philippine state was not in any way considered.
The denial of their petition as well as the rejection of the Bacon Bill of
1926 in the US Congress which proposed that Mindanao and Sulu
become one of the states of the US on the one hand, and inevitability of
Philippine independence after an American sponsored 10-year transition
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period under a Commonwealth Republic on the other hand, led Muslim
leaders to reconfigure their identity in line with the impending Philippine
nation-state. Muslim leaders declared themselves as “Filipinos” and
considered Moro—pejoratively associated with piracy, savagery, slavery,
treachery, amok (juramentado), and other negative connotations—as a
name that is unacceptable.
Even so, the last-ditch effort of Muslims to live separately from
Christian Filipinos was made in 1935 (the year when the Commonwealth
Republic was inaugurated) when Lanao leaders appealed to the US
government and the American people to exclude Mindanao and Sulu in
the proposed independence to the Filipinos. The same proposal was
trashed.
The difficult, often bloody process of integrating Muslims into
the Philippine body politic and centralized power of the state took over
30 years from the time the Commonwealth Republic was established,
interrupted only during the Second World War. Muslim traditional and
modern political elite who took part in the process of strengthening the
Filipino-ness into the consciousness of Muslim masses did not only fail
but generated a counter-consciousness that challenge the self-ascribed
identity promoted by the Muslim elite.
The emergence of new intellectuals and counter-elite among the
Muslims and the political events that transpired in the late 1960s until
early 1970s triggered the re-invention of Muslim identity. The massacre
of about 28 Muslim military trainees (called “Jabidah commandos”) in
Corregidor Island in March 1968 rekindled the quest of Muslims for
independence after almost 50 years when it was first clamored in the
1920s.
Although traditional Muslim politicians formed their own organization
that appears to have secessionist intentions, like the Muslim (later
renamed Mindanao) Independence Movement (MIM) set up by then
Cotabato Province’s Governor, Datu Udtog Matalam,2 and the Bangsa
Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO) founded by then member of the
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House of Representatives (HOR) Raschid Lucman3 in 1968 and 1971
respectively, non-traditional politico and intellectual Nur Misuari’s Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) was the only Muslim organization that
militarily challenged the state for more than two decades (1971-1996)
in its bid to secede 13 out of 25 provinces of Mindanao island from the
Republic.
The MNLF’s vision of a secessionist war was emphatically secular in
orientation rather than Islamic. Its goal is to reclaim the Bangsa Moro
(Moro Nation)4, the Muslims’ homeland that has been “unjustifiably
annexed by the Philippine state.” Misuari called upon his brethren to
renounce their identities as Filipino-Muslims and declare their identity
and nationality as Moro, a reincarnation of the pre-colonial identity as
the descendants of the “unsubjugated” and “uncolonized” peoples.
The Bangsamoro struggle is an expression of a “reactive nationalism,”
articulated by the new and non-traditional counter-elite on a reactive
basis, and resonates with Muslim society which is undergoing some “crisis
of self-confidence.” It demonizes the threats of the state as the enemy
and mobilizes the masses to take collective action against such threats.
It has to appeal to an educated Muslim middle class and is invariably
populist, intended to induct the masses into politics.
Nonetheless, the independence movement was never united from
the time Misuari called for Moro national unity. The self-determination
struggle has been saddled with leadership crisis and power struggles
between and among the three major Moro ethnic groups – Tausug,
Maguindanaoan, and Maranao. The movement suffered from no less
than five major splits and factions (Buendia 2005: 116-118). The issue
of Moro unification has been the overriding concern not only by the
Moro leaders and masses themselves but also those which support Muslim
self-governance and autonomy struggle like the Organization of Islamic
Conference (OIC)5, the Muslim World League (MWL), and the Muslim
World Congress (MWC).
When the MNLF signed the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) with the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) in 1996, the MNLF-
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led secessionist war ended but carried forward by the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF).6 The MILF is now the most potent armed
organization pursuing the Moro secessionist movement. The government
has acknowledged its armed capability to threaten the territorial integrity
of the state.
Notwithstanding the ideological differences between the MNLF and
MILF — the former as more secular while the latter being more Islamic
— they see themselves as “one people.” The consciousness of being one
people distinct from the neighboring peoples, the Filipinos, Bangsamoro
is articulated and self ascribed, bound collectively on the basis of a
common ancestry, history, society, institutions, territory, and more
importantly, religion.
The late MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim believed that what the GRP-
MNLF FPA resolved was the government’s problem and not the
Bangsamoro problem, “the agreement never touched the core of the
Bangsamoro problem which is the illegal and immoral usurpation of
their (referring to the Moros) ancestral homeland and legitimate rights
to freedom and self-determination”.7
Hashim’s successor, Al Haj Murad Ebrahim expressed in his message
delivered on the occasion of the fasting month of Ramadhan in November
2003, that “there can be no genuine peace and development unless the
right of the Bangsamoro people to self-determination is adequately
addressed.”8 In an effort to pursue the “self-determination” agenda in
the GRP-MILF peace talks, the MILF pushes the issue of ancestral domain.
It hopes that government’s recognition of the right of the Bangsamoro
over their ancestral domain will eventually result to the acknowledgement
of Moros’ territory.
What is said and done
The concept and definition self-determination is broad and
encompasses both external and internal dimensions of self-determination.
External self-determination usually refers to the right of people to secede
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its conceived territory from an existing state. Internal self-determination
concerns the choice of a system of governance and the administration
of the functions of governance according to the will of the governed.
In both respects, self-determination is an acknowledged principle of
the basic human right of individuals to participate in democratic
governance. This includes the individual’s right to engage in the political,
economic or cultural system of the state. Secondly, it is also a collective
right of groups as national, religious, ethnic or linguistic minorities to
express, practice, and promote their own culture, life-ways, language,
and religion which require protection from the state. Thirdly, it is a
guaranteed right of people to their homeland or claimed territory which
embodies their identity, culture, and political autonomy. Finally, the right
to self-determination, especially the claim to one’s territory, has to enjoy
the state’s consent. While people are entitled to their territory, this does
not necessarily extend to a free determination of the international legal
status of the territory. The right is bounded by the endorsement or rejection
by the state concerned taking into account the physical or geographical
and demographical changes that have occurred in the area that people
have “historical claim.”9
The different meanings of self-determination have varied implications
both to the peoples and the state in asserting their legal and inherent
right under the doctrine of self-determination. The right of a group with
a distinctive politico territorial identity to determine its own destiny is the
political translation of aspirations in the demands for self-determination.
Judge Hardy Dillard of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), writing in
his Individual Opinion in the 1975 Western Sahara Case, says that: “It
is for the people to determine the destiny of the territory and not the
territory the destiny of the people” (ICJR 1975: 144).
One of the most vital reasons for people in exercising control over a
piece of territory is that it reifies power. Tillich points out:
Being means having space or, more exactly, providing space for
oneself. This is the reason for the tremendous importance of
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geographical space and the fight for its possession by power
groups. The struggle is not simply an attempt to remove another
group from a given space. The real purpose is to draw this space
into a larger power field, to deprive it of a centre of its own
(Williams 1988: 217).
What makes the right to self-determination so difficult to clarify is
that its exercise involves a clash of fundamental world order principles.
On the one side is the sense that peoples have the right to statehood.
Articles 1 (2) and 55 of the United Nations (UN) Charter have embodied
the principle of self-determination as one of its guiding philosophies.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) pursued the issue
further by stating that self-determination is not simply a principle but a
right of everyone to “liberty.” The International Covenants on Human
Rights—The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR)—specifically provide in Article 1 of each that:
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development. (UNHR 1978)
On the other side is the principle of upholding the territorial sanctity
of existing states.
The adoption of the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (DGICCP) in the form
of a General Assembly Resolution is instructive. It confirms the right to
self-determination in relation to colonialism and denies some forms of
the right’s wider application. Evidently, it appreciates the inevitable tension
between the exercise of the right to self-determination and the parallel
set of rights associated with territorial integrity of existing and emerging
sovereign states. Thus, it reiterates Article 1 of the ICESCR and ICCPR
in its Operative Provision 2 but at the same time qualifies such right in
its Provision 6 which reads:
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Any attempt at the partial or total disruption of the national unity
and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations
(UNGA Resolution 1514, December 1960).
Provision 6 of the DGICCP culminated in the adoption of the
influential Declaration of Principles Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States in 1970 as the UN General Assembly
Resolution 2625. The resolution accepted the principle of the right to
self-determination that is linked to the notion of “equal rights of peoples”
but cautioned that the right shall not be construed as:
… authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember
or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political
unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves
in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples … and thus possessed of a government
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction as to race, creed or colour. (UNGA Resolution 2625,
24 October 1970)
The assurance of territorial unity is now made contingent on the
government being representative of the whole people and institution of
fairness which pursues non-discriminatory policies in relation to “race,
creed, or color,” and full right to self-determination (including secession)
pertains only in colonial situations. It is intended and administered in a
way that is consistent with the territorial designs and administrative
practices imposed by the colonizers rather than the “people determin(ing)
the destiny of the(ir) territory” as Dillard assumes.
Dillard’s dictum indicates that accidents of geography and of
historically established territorial divisions are not limitations to peoples’
collective free will and decision to shape their destiny. This presupposes
that if the formation of the state is a product of peoples’ collective action,
then they also have the power and right to undo it. Hence by logical
extension, groups and peoples living within an existing state must also
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be able to assert their will by deciding to leave it, carve a new sovereign
unit out of an existing one, or re-claim a state which had existed before
the advent of colonial rule or “modern” state. While this sounds logical,
reality is of course very different.
Contrary to Dillard’s maxim, peoples’ will can only apply within the
political, not cultural boundaries that have been colonially demarcated.
Weller argues that:
Self determination is not aimed to restore ethnic or tribal links
among populations that were artificially divided by the colonizers.
Instead, the ‘people’ entitled to self-determination are those who
happen to live within the colonial boundaries drawn by the
colonial powers. Self-determination action is taken in a way that
does not fully overcome, but merely reshapes, facts on the basis
of the reality of colonial administration. And it is the territorial
shape of that administration that defines the self-determination
entity, not the will of the people (Wellner 2005: 11).
In the history of peoples’ self-determination struggles in the last 62
years after the Second World War, only Bangladesh in 1971 gained its
independence from Pakistan through force of arms. The Turkish invasion
of Cyprus in 1974 did not produce a state while Singapore’s peaceful
separation from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965 was not a result of
secession but expulsion. East Timor on the other hand obtained its
liberation in 1999 as a result of a de-colonization process in a UN-
supervised referendum at the cost of tens of thousands of East Timorese
lives lost, properties destroyed, and gross human rights violations
committed by the Indonesian military.
Colonialism generates the self-determination entity and therefore
defines the state that may unfold. As practiced, “peoples’ will” could
only apply within boundaries that have been previously defined by former
colonizers. Not even different ethnic groups living in the same physical
space but had been earlier ruled by different colonial masters would be
entitled to form their own state, or perhaps to associate in part with
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neighboring ethnic kin states. Rather, the right to self-determination is to
be employed by people who have been subjected to the same colonizer
and who in turn utilizes such right as a political instrument for de-
colonization. The broad visions of struggle for self-governance have not
been applied to multi-nation states arbitrarily created by colonizers.
The UN General Assembly Resolution 2526 (XXV) on the Declaration
of Principles of International Law proclaims that the principle of equality
of rights and self-determination of peoples cannot be interpreted to
connote the recognition of the dismemberment and fragmentation on
ethnic and religious grounds. Affirming the doctrine of territorial integrity,
ethnic, religious, and sub-national cultural entities and groups can only
claim territorial and political autonomy within the new state boundaries.
Hence, external self-determination is an act that cannot be taken up
more than once. When a colonial territory has exercised the option of
independence, ethnic groups living in the new state boundaries cannot
invoke the right to self-determination against the newly declared
independent state. It is therefore not a continuing action against the
state.
An exception to this rule, as noted by Wellner (2005: 29), would
relate to a self-determination entity that does not opt to become
independent but decides to associate, but not integrate, with another
state. In such case, self-determination status of the entity is maintained
or transformed into a situation wherein the right to self-determination
can be asserted within the provisions of the state’s constitution. However,
there is very little practice of this kind.
Notably, in the international law literature on self-determination, two
main views are pulling in opposite directions. The first tendency is the
more restrictive view which limits the exercise of the right to self-
determination within the confines of the territorial jurisdiction of existing
states; the right cannot be invoked if the territorial unity of the state will
be transgressed.
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The second view is expansionary which acknowledges and, to varying
degrees, validates recent state-busting practice in a reformulated legal
approach that admits that the character and scope of the right are more
unsettled than ever. This latter view takes due note of the degree to which
non-sovereign territories of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and
Czechoslovakia were given diplomatic recognition and admitted to the
UN as sovereign states.
The controversy on the principle and right to self-determination has
led peoples and states to armed conflict. Struggles for autonomy and
secession on the defense of peoples’ national rights are politically and
militarily confronted by the state, invoking its right to protect the
inviolability of its territory. Peoples of the world are told they have the
right to self-determination. Nevertheless, if this right is suppressed by a
sovereign state, the international community supports territorial integrity
until a war of independence is successful. As in the past, the entire
problem is settled on the battlefield. The conflict has been the source of
tremendous human suffering and destruction in Asia, Africa, and Europe.
Etching self-determination in the Consti tut ion
As discussed earlier, the right to self-determination can be exercised
in two major ways: one, through secession otherwise known as external
self-determination based directly on international law and two, through
constitutional means also known as internal self-determination. In the
latter case, ethno-linguistic, cultural, religious or sub-national groups
are said to have guaranteed political and cultural autonomy and freedom
to chart their own future in accordance with the provisions of the state’s
constitution. Groups are thought to be permitted to establish a separate
legal personality for component parts of the overall state. In fact,
international law now appears to take note of constitutional self-
determination as a possible alternative to nation-state building. As such,
some countries have etched in their constitution the right to self-
determination as a fundamental entitlement of peoples, nations, and
cultural groups to build their own nation-state. Far from being exhaustive,
some examples of internal self-determination are discussed.
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Article 39 (1) of the 1994 Ethiopian Constitution stipulates that
certain nominated constituent entities should enjoy a right to external
self-determination. It declares that “Every Nation, Nationality and People
in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including
the right to secession.”10
Likewise, Article 4 (2) of the Constitution of the Principality of
Liechtenstein permits each municipality to “remove itself from the state-
community” while conditional self-determination has been awarded by
the Parliament of Moldova in 1994 to the people of Gagauzia (one of
the three republics – Moldova, Gagauzia, and Transnistria) the right to
“external self-determination” if the status of the country would change.
The Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia adopted by the
Parliament on 23 December 1994 declares that Gagauzia is a national-
territorial autonomous unit that is an “integral part of the Republic”
(Article 1[1]) but:
In case of a change of the status of the Republic of Moldova as
an independent state, the people of Gagauzia shall have the
right to external self-determination (Article 1[4]).
Many European human rights organizations recognize and promote
Gagauzia as a successful model for resolving ethnic conflicts.
Although the three cases above may provide the opportunity for
nations and peoples to exercise their right to self-determination sometime
in the future or when conditions warrant such action, previous experience
proved that the state made use of its power to frustrate peoples’ attempt
to secede.
A classic example of constitutional self-determination was the former
Union of Socialist Soviet Republic’s (USSR) constitution. Article 70 of its
1977 constitution provides that the Union, formed under the principle
of socialist federation, is an integral, federal, and multinational state
where nations and peoples are free to assert their right to self-
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determination. While Article 72 says that “Each Union Republic shall
retain the right freely to secede from the USSR,” Article 73(2) assigned
to the USSR jurisdiction in relation to the determination of the state
boundaries of the USSR and also approval of changes in the boundaries
between Union Republics.
Hence, when the Baltic states asserted their right to self-determination
under Article 72 between the years 1989 and 1990, the USSR did not
only use Article 73(2) but also Article 78 which provides the assignment
of competence between the federation and self-determining entity to
thwart peoples’ attempt to gain their independence from the Union.
However, the issue was resolved entirely when the USSR was dissolved in
the wake of an unsuccessful coup against President Gorbachev. In this
case, constitutional self-determination was not fully tested.
In like manner, the 1993 new Russian Federation’s constitution
reiterated the self-determination right to peoples, to wit:
We, the multi-ethnic people of the Russian Federation, united by
our common destiny of our land, seeking to advance human
rights and freedoms and promote civil peace and accord,
preserving a historically established state unity, guided by
universally recognized principles of equality and self-determination
of peoples . . . renewing the sovereign statehood of Russia . . .
Nevertheless, Article 66.5 explicitly provides that:
The status of a member of the Russian Federation may be altered
by the mutual consent of the Russian Federation and the member
of the Russian Federation in accordance with a federal
constitutional law.
The above constitutional provision was used when Chechnya, a full
federal entity under the Russian Federation, asserted its right to self-
determination in 1991. The Russian military labeled the Chechen freedom
fighters as rebels and insurgents to justify its invasion of Chechnya and
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launched its military assault in 1994. In 1997, the Federation concluded
an agreement with Chechnya which expressly recognized it as a self-
determination entity and foresaw a resolution of the conflict in
accordance with the international law. However, when the alleged
Chechen terrorists attacked Moscow in December 2001, the Russian
Federat ion uni lateral ly annul led that agreement and forcibly
reincorporated Chechnya. The European Union (EU) supported the
Federation’s territorial integrity instead of the claimed rights of Chechnya
to independence.
Another is the case of the former Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (SFRY). Section 1 of its 1974 constitution says:
The nations of Yugoslavia, proceeding from the right to every
nation to self-determination, including the right to secession, on
the basis of their will freely expressed in the common struggle of
all nations and nationalities in the National Liberation War and
Socialist Revolution, and in conformity with their historic
aspirations, aware that further consolidation of their brotherhood
and unity is in the common interest, have, together with the
nationalities with which they live, united in a federal republic of
free and equal nations and nationalities and founded a socialist
federal community of working people—the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia . . .
The constitutional provision on self-determination was put to the test
in 1991 when Croatia and Slovenia unilaterally declared independence
from the SFRY. As in past cases, the independence movements were
meted out with excessive use of military force and violence by the Belgrade
government in the name of the state’s right to protect its territorial
boundaries and maintain territorial unity.
The USSR and SFRY experience had shown that constitutional
guarantees for self-determination right are not really guarantees. The
state remains an all-powerful entity which can define and re-define the
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meaning and modalities of exercising the right to self-determination.
However, as proven from the past, the state, in spite of the support of
the international community to territorial integrity, is no match to a
determined separatist movement which can instigate the dissolution of
the state itself. The consequences nonetheless are unimaginably high in
terms of the cost they entai l  on human l ives, propert ies and
infrastructures, and displacements of people.
Although the case of Canada is slightly different with reference to
Quebec’s (French-speaking Canadians) possible secession from the
Federation, it remains consistent in terms of the role, power, and function
of the state.  Despite the absence of constitutional provision on self-
determination in the Canadian constitution, its Supreme Court ruled
that secession is not mandatory on the part of the state to accede even
if there is “a clear majority vote in Quebec on a clear question in favor
of secession….” The Court affirmed that the independence of Quebec
is still subject to “good faith negotiations” between the state and the
self-determining entity (Wellner 2005: 22).
Nonetheless, this was never put into practice. In the 1995
referendum, the Quebecois nationalists lost in a very close vote: 50.6%
to 49.4%, or only 53,498 votes out of more than 4,700,000 votes
cast. Approximately 90% of Anglophones (English-speaking) and
allphones (mostly immigrants and first-generations Quebecois whose
native language is neither French nor English) Quebecois voted against
the referendum, while almost 60% only out of 82% of Francophones
(French-speaking) voted Yes to Quebec’s sovereignty (NLC 2001:54).
The prospect of the Moro right to self-determination
On 11 March 2007, it was reported that a breakthrough in the
long-drawn, intermittent, and unstable peace talks between the Philippine
government and the MILF has been made. The government has offered
Muslims in Mindanao the right to self-determination (PDI 2007: 2).
However, Rudy Rodil, one of the GRP peace negotiators, clarified in the
same report that although Muslim self-governance has been provided
16     Philippine Political Science Journal 29 (52) 2008
in all areas, this does not include “defense, foreign affairs, [and] the
monetary and postal systems.” While the proposal is yet to be finalized
in the GRP-MILF Formal Talks, the MILF has welcomed the development.
“We feel it is an advancement in the search for peace in Mindanao,”
says MILF Chair Murad. Silvestre Afable, then the government’s chief
negotiator, further noted that the “issue of territory remained unresolved,”
and some proposals need Congressional approval. Yet unsettled, a ray
of hope has emerged. A new relationship between the state and MILF
that could make continued territorial unity possible is most inspiring
towards addressing the long-drawn conflict in Mindanao.
Given the general theory and common practice of self-determination
in the world, it appears that the Moro struggle for external self-
determination would be arduous at this time. The peace process currently
being undertaken jointly by GRP and MILF with the participation of the
OIC through Malaysia’s facilitation, in spite of some violations on
ceasefire agreements, gives a semblance of legitimacy on the part of the
state to address the conflict within the confines of the Philippine
constitution.
If there is anything that one has to learn from the experience of self-
determination struggles of peoples in the world under the context of the
international state system, it is that the right to self-determination is plainly
elusive. The right to self-determination, established in the late 1950s
and 1960s as a decolonization instrument, was enforceable only in
relation to a small number of governments that continued to cling to
colonial rule at that time. It was conceived to restore justice to nations
which have been subjected to colonialism. It was never intended to de-
stabilize existing sovereign states or states which have been freed from
colonial rule. The doctrine of self-determination, more than ever, is to
safeguard the territorial integrity (free from external invasion) and
territorial unity (free from internal armed conflict coming from secessionist
movements) of independent states.
Self-determination offers a promise of independence and liberation
to peoples from a state that marginalizes and discriminates them.
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Nonetheless, states know for a fact that such promise is a plain chimera.
The international state system, established more than 60 years after the
Second World War, has historically rendered support to states challenged
by secessionist movements and groups. Moreover the state is usually
given a carte blanche in dealing with groups seeking to assert their
separate identity. The state system thus, gives supreme importance to
“stability” rather than justice, at least as seen by groups seeking
independence from a state considered as purveyor of “internal
colonialism.”
As discussed in the beginning of this paper, the notion of Bangsa
Moro is quite new. It emerged only in 1968 in the wake of the Jabidah
massacre and has yet to be crystallized. Historical facts attest that the
shifting of Muslim identities from the time the Republic gained its
independence from the Americans until late 1960s indicates the
hollowness of Moro consciousness and concept of a Bangsa Moro.
It took Misuari’s MNLF, in the course of its anti-Muslim elite and
anti-dictatorial struggle against Marcos, to remind his Muslim brethrens
that they have to re-claim their homeland and redeem the Moro nation-
state from the Philippine state. In a nationalist project such as the MNLF’s
separatist movement, the attempt to wrest control of a proclaimed
national territory from the illegitimate seizure of another state regarded
as alien, is the overarching feature. The MILF is not an exemption. All
MNLF and MILF informants in the study traced the historical roots of the
Moro identity and Bangsa Moro centuries before the advent of
colonialism. From their perspective, the Moro nation-state has already
existed that never succumbed to colonial rule but illegitimately annexed
by the current Philippine republic. Mastura’s undated manuscript,
“Mindanao Conflict: Political and Territorial Framework”, is a good
attempt to abstract the historical roots of Moro nation-state building
within the framework of international law.
Understandably, the Bangsa Moro requires a history, an imagined
national past that is essential in the quest and process of nation-building.
A nation is “an imagined political community – (one) imagined as both
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inherently limited and sovereign” where people “not so much to kill, as
willingly to die for such limited imaginings” (Anderson 1983: 15, 16).
For Anderson, the imagined community of the nation is a mass fiction. It
is not clear, however, who, if anyone, imagines a particular community
and if there is any difference in the resulting fictional community, depends
on who imagines it and how one does so. Invariably, the history of the
Muslims during the Spanish era, as narrated by some nationalist
movements, culling uncritically from accounts of historians, to a certain
extent requires a more scholarly and independent analysis, an important
concern which this paper cannot deal with at the moment.
Nevertheless, what is important for them is that stories should be
generally believed or that there should be substantial convergence in
the versions of a story that are to be believed. Stories are not only needed
at the time during which a national identity is being created, it is also
required for one to understand what it means to be a Bangsamoro
(referring to the Moro people) and one has to accept a version or some
versions of the common story to grasp the significance of one’s identity.
In other words, historical accuracy is not vital in constituting a nation
since the story is told for the purpose of self-definition. And Bangsa Moro’s
self-definition bears on the goals that its members will try to pursue in
the future. Leaders of separatist movements have to defy the modern
state in which they are found, challenge their authority, and confront
their armed forces. They present themselves as rulers as well as rebels in
order to supplant the jurisdiction of the alienized state with their own
localized version.  History making or myth making is in part and parcel
an idea in the whole process of nation-creation.
If the MILF (which now leads the struggle for Muslim self-
determination) has to pursue its bid for Muslim independence, it needs
to prove that its case is a decolonization issue aside from fully satisfying
the stringent criteria of statehood (territory, population, effective
government) as required by the international community. However, it
appears that the question of decolonization would be a tenuous issue in
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as much as the Moroland – Mindanao, Sulu archipelago, and Palawan
– has been part of the Philippine nation-state when the former American
colonizers granted the Philippines its independence in 1946. Likewise,
the principle of equality of rights and self-determination of peoples refrains
a state from any partial or total disruption of one’s territorial integrity
(UNGA Res. 2526 [XXV]).
Experience has demonstrated that the state system is inclined to
defend and safeguard the sovereign state’s territory. The probability of
endorsing the right to the state to its territorial unity over the MILF’s
case of self-determination is therefore highly to be bestowed by the
international community.
An alternative to external self-determination is to seek substantial
and meaningful political and cultural autonomy within the Philippine
political system not necessarily within the current presidential unitary
system as defined in the constitution. Conferring a semi-sovereign status
resembling a federal structure of governance to Muslim areas of
Mindanao would be an option that the state can work on to further the
nation-state building not only of the Philippines but also of the Muslims.
A “unified approach” (Kingsbury 1992: 481-513) in bringing together
various ethnic, religious, and national groups into the Philippine nation-
state in general and Mindanao in particular can be a promising politico-
administrative instrument in dealing with the complexity of living in a
physical environment where people of differing ethnicities, religious beliefs,
and cultures thrive and prosper, and conflicts are resolved and justice
claimed in a non-violent means.
In other words, internal self-determination would be a better, less
violent, and workable choice that the MILF can take. Nevertheless,
pursuing internal self-determination in the long term necessitates the
state to comprehend fully the root causes of Moros’ self-determination
struggle. Unless the rationale behind secessionism is appreciated and
resolved to its conclusion through sustained, comprehensive, coherent,
and appropriate national policies coupled with effective and methodical
policy implementation, secessionism would continue to inspire the Moros
in search for valuable political power and social justice.
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Conclus ion
The internationally-recognized right to self-determination is an offer
to peoples and nations to become independent from the state. However,
the international state system assures that this offer is less than useful to
those who need it. States are guaranteed of their right to preserve the
integrity of their territory. The state system has been rigged to ensure
that central governments will prevail in self-determination conflicts. This
has been the reality over 60 years after the establishment of the post-
World War II international system.
The offer of the Philippine government of the right to self-
determination to the MILF is a clear case that the proposal does not go
beyond the impairment of the state’s territory. Experiences from the world
indicate that states thwart the right to self-determination by offering wide-
ranging self-government and power-sharing or even provide a possibility
of separation, often after a prolonged interim period. Some Muslim
scholars subscribed to the latter (Lingga 2007). In the Philippines where
peace agreements are seldom respected and had been subject to the
changing power configuration of the state, concurring to a long-term
debate on issues of self-determination prior to an agreed referendum is
tantamount to a delayed if a denial of an opportune and steadfast
resolution of conflict.
The paper concludes that the right to self-determination cannot be
simply invoked by those who consider themselves as a “separate” people
from the rest of the population inhabiting the current state. Although a
guaranteed right provided by the international community to indigenous
peoples, minorities, and nations, states are not in any way obligated
and compelled to assure such right is executed in accordance with the
“spirit and letter” of self-determination covenants. Drawing from the
experience and trends in self-determination, the Moros’ effort to secede
from the Philippine state is bound to face stiff resistance not only from
the Republic but also from other states confronted with similar problems
relative to secessionism. The paper further contends that the threat of
national disintegration will continue until an appropriate institutional
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framework for political governance which can accommodate Mindanao’s
social and ethnic diversity is ensconced.
The paper suggests that it has to train its attention on a more feasible
alternative — assert their right to self-determination internally rather than
externally. While there is no assurance that meaningful Bangsamoro self-
governance would transpire under a unitary presidential system, new
forms of co-governance may be tested to build the Philippine nation-
state. v
Notes
1 The term Moro was the name used by the Spaniards to refer to Muslim inhabitants in the
Philippines alluding to the Muslim Moorish occupation of the Iberian Peninsula (Spain and
Portugal) and the northern coast of the African continent in 711 A.D. In 16th century, the
Spaniards encountered the ferocious resistance of Muslims inhabiting the Southern
Sultanates of the country in their attempt to colonize the archipelago. This reminded them
of their ancient enemy, the Moors, thus called the Philippine Muslims Moros (Phelan
1959: 4-8; Corpuz 1989: 46).
2 It was accounted that the creation of MIM was Datu Udtog Matalam’s personal response
to traditional filthy electoral system in Cotabato that had been disadvantageous to his
political ambitions rather than a reaction to the Jabidah massacre and an intention to
carve a separate state from the Philippines (McKenna 1998: 144-149).
3 The word Moro was later dropped from BMLO as it remains unacceptable to many of the
Muslims. BMLO adopted Bangsa Muslimin Islamic Liberation Organization (BMILO) as
its new name in 1984 (Jubair 1999: 152).
4 The term bangsa or bansa is a Malay word that usually refers to nations, castes, descent
groups or lines, races or estates. Informants of this study prefer to use it as one word,
Bangsamoro. For the purpose of this paper, Bangsa Moro shall be used to mean the
“Moro Nation” as imagined by Filipino Muslims and Bangsamoro to refer to the “people”
inhabiting the Philippines.
5The Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), founded in 1971, comprises 54 countries
(including the non-state, Palestine). One of its major activities is to settle conflicts by
peaceful means, mainly through mediation, negotiation, and arbitration. The OIC had
been instrumental in forging the 1976 and 1996 GRP-MNLF Tripoli Agreement and Final
Peace Agreement respectively.
6 MILF was a breakaway group from MNLF headed by Salamat Hashim, a Maguindanaoan.
It started as a reformist group in 1977, then known as New MNLF, that advocated for
autonomy rather than independence to enable it to negotiate with the then Marcos
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government and woo the support of the OIC when Misuari became intransigent that
threatened the collapse of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement signed between the MNLF and
GRP. Unsuccessful in his attempts, Hashim renamed his organization in 1984 as the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front and made Islam as its official ideology.
7 “The Moro Struggle for Self-Determination and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.”
Available from: http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/
A l lDocWeb/4F62C40ACE5A0370C12568F70058401C/$ f i l e /MI LF_se l f -
determination.PDF. (Accessed on 02 February 2007).
8 “Murad extends greetings of peace and solidarity to Muslim believers”, 10 November
2003 News. Available from: <http://www.luwaran.com/> (Accessed on 29 March 2003).
9 This doctrine is, however, displaced in certain circumstances, in cases of territorial
change that are anticipated in historical arrangements such as the hand-over of Hong
Kong (see Marc Weller, “Self-determination trap,” Ethnopolitics 4: 1, 3-28 March 2005,
p. 7).
10 Article 39 (5) defines “nation, nationality and people” as follows:
A ‘Nation, Nationality or People’ for the purpose of this Constitution, is a group of people
who have or share a large measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual
intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identities, a common psychological
make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory.
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